Somaliland, the northern region of Somalia, declared independence in 1991 and has 
Introduction
Since the fall of Siyad Barre (Somalia's long serving dictator president) in 1991, and to a large extent several years before that, Somalia ceased to function as a unifi ed state with centralised political and security authority.
While it is still often seen as the archetype of a failed state, Somalia today presents the scholar of international relations with a peculiar example of a highly complex and diverse socio-political landscape, the problems of which are compounded by the inability of international leaders and decision-makers to move away from stereotypical and outdated notions of state inviolability and engage with realities on the ground. as an independent, sovereign, and internationally recognised state in 1960 before its unifi cation with Somalia. Since 1991, this breakaway state has managed to establish a high degree of security and control over its territory, provide for economic reconstruction of the war-torn country, and hold several democratic elections. However, not withstanding Somaliland's achievements in state-building, the international community has been highly reluctant and very slow to recognize the territory's claims to independence and stabilizing role in the troubled Somali region.
In the words of one scholar "the international response to the (re)birth of Somaliland has been marked by an overwhelming lack of interest" (Geldenhuys 2009: 139) .
To put it another way, the inability or lack of interest of the international community in dealing with the complex political situation in Somalia is very clearly refl ected in the status of Somaliland. While African governments and the African Union (AU), coupled with the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), and other Western donors have for years funded and provided international recognition to the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia, not withstanding their abysmal record of inaptitude, corruption, and lack of popular legitimacy in the country, the same countries and international organisations still do not recognise the only part of Somalia that actually boasts a legitimate and democratically elected government and has managed to remain largely peaceful since 1991.
In order to understand Somaliland's inability to secure international recognition, it is important to examine the country's relationship with segments of the African community of states.
1 This article therefore discusses the continental and regional players in Somaliland's recognition game, and seeks to analyse their positions on the country's independence. The article fi rstly outlines a brief history of political developments in Somalia and Somaliland since independence, and then turns to an analysis AU of "heavyweights" such as Egypt and South Africa, both of whom have a pronounced interest in, and close association with Somaliland and Somali issues. Following this, the discussion focuses on Somaliland's immediate neighbourhood and analyzes Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and their relationships with the territory. Finally, the discussion culminates with an analysis of the AU's position towards Somaliland and how its lacking policies regarding Somaliland have contributed to the territory's international political isolation. Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool (the last 1 There is also a word to be said about Somaliland's relationship with segments of the wider international community, especially Western powers such as the UK and US. Although this article is dedicated to exploring the African context of Somaliland's lacking international recognition, it should be noted that one could easily write another article examining the interference of the formerly mentioned countries in Somali affairs, and their adverse effects on the political situation in Somalia/Somaliland.
Map of Somalia. Somaliland is made up of the northern provinces of

Somalia and Somaliland: Independence to 1991
During the period of colonialism from roughly the 1880s to World War Two, the lands inhabited by Somali peoples were administered by various non- Ogaden region). As a result of these different foreign administrations and their administrative and governance traditions, the inhabitants of these regions experienced very different colonial legacies.
The British, for example, favored a limited or "thin" involvement in
Somaliland and invested meagerly in the local infrastructure with minimal numbers of British settlements, whereas the Italians invested more in Somalia and encouraged Italian settlement and the development of local agriculture (Lewis 2008: 30-31) . While this is not the place to offer an exhaustive account of different colonial policies in Somalia, it will suffi ce to say that different administrative languages coupled with different governing traditions paved the way for severe diffi culties for Somalis in bringing the two colonial territories together upon independence.
In July 1960, after some eighty years of European domination and overlordship, the new Republic of Somalia was proclaimed (Meredith 2006: 465) . The British protectorate of Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960, four days before it joined Italian Somalia on 1 July to form the new Republic (Lewis 2008: 33) . This fact is highly important regarding Somaliland's current sovereignty claims and drive for international recognition as it serves to prove Somaliland was once an internationally independent political entity even if for only four days.
Without getting bogged down in lengthy assessments of the period after independence and up to 1991, one can provide a brief overview of the arguably most important political developments. Somalia's fi rst civilian administrations proved to be highly corrupt and unable to deal with the many problems the newly independent nation faced. Some of these problems included the newly unifi ed Republic's legal system-four of which she inherited (Italian law, British common law, Islamic law-Sharia, and Somali customary law-Xeer) and needed to merge to create an integrated legal code. Also, within the fi rst few years the enthusiasm for the unifi cation waned as northerners began to realise how politically and economically marginalised they were becoming (Bradbury 2008: 33 they were forced to withdraw almost completely from the region (Clarke and Gosende 2003: 136) .
After the defeat in the Ogaden War and during the 1980s Barre developed a strong anti-Soviet stance, which resulted in high levels of aid from the Western world. For example, in the 1980s Italy provided Somalia with $1 billion in aid, half of it in military supplies, while the US supplied some $800 million worth of aid, one-quarter in military assistance (Meredith 2006: 468) .
By the end of the 1980s, the country was receiving twenty percent of total US aid to Africa (Besteman 1999: 15 Mogadishu" (Meredith 2006: 469; Clapham 1998: 151) . After protracted street fi ghting and considerable devastation of the capital, the militias and liberation movements managed to expel Barre from Somalia in January 1991. However, Barre's expulsion was not followed by a replacement government, but instead by a long period of violent warfare and looting. As
Menkhaus has argued, the Barre regime's "divide-and-rule tactics stoked deep interclan animosities and distrust, and are held partially responsible for the failure of clans to unite in a post-Barre government " (2006: 80 
Somalia and Somaliland since 1991
The post-Barre war which may have begun as a struggle for control of the government, quickly turned into predatory looting and banditry by various militias. Somalia was also hit by a massive famine in 1992, and in March 1993 the US and UN intervened in the country with a view to helping the famine and war ravaged country. However, after the infamous and highly publicized 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident in which Somali militias downed two US helicopters and killed 18 soldiers, the US had had enough of Somalia and withdrew its troops from the country in March 1994. Soon after the UN followed suit, leaving the country at the mercy of its own warring parties and clan supported militias (Clarke and Gosende 2003: 143-145 
Sharia courts and Al-Shabaab
Developments in Somaliland since 1991
In contrast to events unfolding in the south of Somalia, the northern regions of The Republic of Somaliland, roughly the size of England and Wales, faced grave obstacles upon its declaration of independence. Although the main and highly benefi cial consequence of its declaration of independence was the avoidance of being dragged into a protracted confl ict raging in the south, it had considerable problems of its own. Its territory was devastated by a decade of insurgency and war; it lacked revenues, fi nancial institutions, social services, or direct international support; and half of the population was displaced or living in refugee camps (Bradbury 2008: 77) .
In order to understand much of the rationale for Somaliland's aspirations towards international recognition, and its view that the country deserves recognition, we need to understand the stark contrast between Somaliland and Somalia in terms of internal state-building developments.
The road to peace in Somaliland was paved by many peace and reconciliation conferences and clan elder meetings. Such conferences were concerned with constitutional issues and aimed at agreeing a framework for power sharing amongst Somaliland's clans, creating mechanisms for the participation of clan elders in government, structuring institutions of government, and establishing ways of maintaining security (Bradbury 2008: 96) . It was at one such conference, the Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland (also know as the 1993 Borama Conference) that delegates and elders established the three main branches of Somaliland's government: an executive comprised of a president, vice-president, and council ministers; a bicameral parliament composed of elected representatives and a council of elders; and an independent judiciary (Bradbury 2008: 98-99) .
While Somaliland did experience a fl are up of hostilities and local confl ict in late 1994 and early 1995, the government has on the whole managed to provide for a large degree of security. It is the innovative blend of state and non-state actors in local governance that has managed to maintain security in Somaliland and allow the government the focus and intervene only on issues of direct threat to the stability and integrity of the country as a whole (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009: 49 (Eubank 2012: 468) .
However, it must be noted that the state-building situation in Somaliland is not without issues: there are problems in aligning the goals and objectives of the elected representatives and non-elected elders in the bicameral parliament, issues with recent presidential elections (which include charges of vote rigging and problems with the transfer of power), and disputes with the government of Puntland over the bordering regions of Sool and Sanaag. Nevertheless, for such a young democracy with a very troubled past, Somaliland has set fi rm foundations for a successful future. Although the country is still faced with international isolation, its example as a stable democracy that has survived for over 20 years, and a bottom-up locally engineered system of governance that highlights the ability of Somali people to govern themselves effectively makes calls for its international recognition ever more pressing.
The Players I: Continental African Heavyweights Egypt
Egypt's relationship with, and in interest in, Somalia can only be understood vis-à-vis its relationship with Ethiopia. As Jhazbhay states "Egypt has a long historical interest in Somalia and has in the past used Somalia as a pawn to distract Ethiopia" (2007: 246). Egypt's main concern is the Nile River which constitutes the lifeline of the country. With some eighty six percent of the water reaching the Aswan Dam emanating from Ethiopia, the Egyptian leadership wants to maintain "maximum leverage over Ethiopia" (Shinn 2002: 4-5) .
Egypt was a staunch supporter of Somali unity and the TFG in Mogadishu;
a policy in line with its desires for a strong and unifi ed Somalia which may even one day re-assert its claims over Somali populated areas of Ethiopia, thereby adding to Egypt's leverage (Shinn 2002: 5) . Moreover itself "open to consultations with all parties involved in such intractable confl icts" (Jhazbhay 2007: 284 During the 1980s, Ethiopia directly and indirectly aided the Somali National Movement in its struggle with the Siyad Barre regime by allowing it sanctuary on Ethiopian territory (Bradbury 2008: 61, 62, 93 On the other hand, Ethiopia has also, in 2006, upgraded its representation in Hargeisa at the ambassadorial level (Jhazbhay 2007: 264 Finally, the importance of Ethiopia's geo-political calculus vis-à-vis Egypt and the Arab League needs to be understood in its full context. As
Jhazbhay notes
The diverse Somali protagonists, Somaliland included, are essentially proxies in what has been a long and protracted geo-political powerstruggle between the Nile Basin powers of 'downstream' Egyptdependent as it is on the Nile in terms of its security interests -and its
Arab League allies, and 'upstream' Ethiopia. The latter's land-locked status and sense of encirclement by Arab-Islamic forces drives its vested interests in the outcome of the Somali question. Hence Ethiopia's vested interest in a federalist resolution of confl ict throughout the Somali region, as a safeguard against any future resurgence of Somali irredentism and Egypt's vested interest in a Somali unitary state throughout the entire expanse of the Somali coast, including Somaliland, as a bulwark against Ethiopia and any possibility that Addis Ababa might disrupt
Egypt's access to Nile waters (2007: 259-260) .
This proxy struggle between Ethiopia and Egypt although diffi cult to discern at times, is a real and delicate aspect of the Somaliland question. Both countries favour a particular settlement of the Somali question (Ethiopia a confederation or federation, and Egypt a unitary centralised state) and try and shape political developments in Somalia to suit their own strategic and security interests.
Ethiopia has so far positioned itself well by building considerable infl uence with the Somali Federal Government (and the previous TFG), while at the same time building strong relations and ties with Somaliland. This allows the Ethiopians to keep a fi nger on the political pulse of Somalia and always be informed about developments which may go against their interests.
However, on the other hand, Ethiopia is also very weary of antagonising Arab League powers and Gulf States, due to its heavy economic interdependence on the Gulf region, and this is one of the reasons why it is unlikely to go it alone in recognising Somaliland (Jhazbhay 2007: 261) .
Offi cially, "Ethiopia is unwilling to be the fi rst to recognize Somaliland.
Somalia would immediately attribute nefarious motives to Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland, arguing that it wishes to balkanize Somalia and weaken Somali unity" (Shinn 2002: 4 
Djibouti and Kenya
Somalia's last two neighbours, Djibouti and Kenya, both have a strong interest in Somali affairs, and have at some point in time played important roles in attempting to bring about/infl uence a political settlement in the country. As it currently stands, both countries are also offi cially committed to a unifi ed Somalia, however, with varying degrees of support for Somaliland.
The former French Somali protectorate, Djibouti, is Somaliland's northwestern neighbour and some sixty percent of its population is Somali.
Relations between the two countries have varied, and remain somewhat "correct but not warm"; largely due to Djibouti's hosting of the 2000
Arta conference, and its support for the TFG (Shinn 2002: 4) . Djibouti was considered one of the principal backers of the TNG in the international arena before it collapsed, and during its organisation of the Arta conference relations with Somaliland froze (Geldenhuys 2009: 142 (Jhazbhay 2007: 268) . Youssouf clarifi ed to the US ambassador in Djibouti that Djibouti's policy towards Somalia continued to be guided by three principles: staunch adherence to a "one-Somalia policy" (the Foreign Minister actually stated that it would take a "major shock" to cause Djibouti to revisit this position);
reluctance to be the fi rst state to recognize an independent Somaliland (a position they already conveyed to Somaliland offi cials); and willingness to engage with Somaliland on a "de facto" basis in view of close trade, cultural, and demographic connections (United States 2009a: point 3).
Therefore, while Djibouti may be inclined to widen diplomatic links with Somaliland on an unoffi cial basis, it is still offi cially dedicated to a unifi ed Somalia, and not interested in extending Somaliland formal recognition.
Kenya has a signifi cant Somali population in its Northern District bordering Somalia, and was embroiled in a secessionist confl ict with its Somali population in the mid 1960s. The country is also connected with Somalia through extensive economic and business links via its Somali Diaspora (especially in the Eastleigh district of Nairobi). Also, the string of high profi le independence" (quoted in ICG 2006: 14) . Because of this lack of common policy, coupled with an unwillingness to create innovative ways of dealing with territorial integrity and state secession, the AU has repeatedly failed to come to terms with events on the ground in Somalia. As Bradbury concludes, the AU's strategy in the Kenyan sponsored peace talks "was to 'park' the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in that region. The message from Somaliland, as always, is that it won't wait, that it pulled out of the car park some time ago. It is steering its own course, and hopes that the international community will follow this" (quoted in judge Somaliland's case on its own merits, and don't use the notion of "opening a Pandora's box" as an alibi for not dealing with this issue.
However, Somaliland's bid for observer status to the AU was unsuccessful, and the AU never actually gave Somaliland any feedback following its 2005 fact fi nding mission (Clapham et. al. 2011: 11 all outstanding African self-determination questions will have to be rethought and re-conceptualised in terms of how they contribute to or detract from African integration, and reinforce or overcome Africa's already debilitating fragmentation " (2007: 252) . This is one of the reasons why, for example, Ethiopia is unwilling to initiate any major diplomatic moves towards recognising Somaliland as the regional integration in East and North-East Africa is still in the air in terms of how it will be economically and politically confi gured. So the AU's drive towards greater regional integration works directly against Somaliland's secession, because Somaliland's case directly challenges the AU's integrationist discourse.
While the AU does maintain contacts with the Somaliland government, its "continental internationalist agenda, linked to the evolution of 'regional integration communities' among its sub-regions, is likely to rule out AU offi cial recognition of Somaliland no matter what the legal and political case for such decisions might be" (Jhazbhay 2007: 288 To sum up, we should examine Somaliland's prospects for recognition by the AU. As it currently stands the AU troops in Somalia are in effect the "army" of the Mogadishu based Federal Government, and in that regard, the AU is in fact a warring party heavily supporting a unifi ed Somalia.
Therefore, currently the AU is not interested in recognising Somaliland.
Even a limited concession such as awarding Somaliland observer status at the AU is too innovative for the organization to entertain. For Somaliland to be taken seriously by the AU "it must persuade the organisation that its request is justifi able under international law, serves the greater interest of the AU as a whole (or at least of enough individual member states to swing a vote) and would contribute to the stability and development of the region" (ICG 2006: 10) . Somaliland is already treading along that path, and key AU states such as Ethiopia and South Africa might consider assessing Somaliland's recognition case "in terms of how this could either contribute to or detract from advancing the stability of the Somali coast and, based on such an assessment, whether or not Ethiopia and South Africa, together with the AU, could fashion a diplomacy of reconciling Somaliland and Somalia accordingly" (Jhazbhay 2007: 303) . However, such developments depend on many factors completely outside of Somaliland's control, and this examination of the AU's stance towards Somaliland is a good indication of the complexities and obstacles Somaliland faces in achieving international recognition.
Conclusions
The purpose of this article has been to analyse the roles of key players Somaliland's claims to statehood, reporting favourably that the territory was indeed entitled to international recognition. South Africa remains one of the few states, in addition to Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, which recognise Somaliland travel documents (Clapham et.al. 2011: 22) .
Ethiopia and Egypt are locked in a strategic diplomatic proxy war over Somalia's fate, and this is evidenced by their respective positions on Somaliland. Egypt does not recognise Somaliland, and was one of the main backers of the TFG, either bilaterally or through the Arab League.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, is happy to offi cially maintain the status quo of not recognising Somaliland, while behind the scenes working very closely with Somalilanders on forging close trade and diplomatic ties.
Ethiopia remains the most favourably disposed African country towards
Somaliland's recognition, and has a long history of good relations with Somaliland's leadership. While Ethiopia is unlikely to recognise Somaliland without AU support, it is also a key player in the AU, and can use its infl uence to Somaliland's advantage. However, because of its "historical baggage" with Somalia, it is very reluctant to be the fi rst country to recognise Somaliland. it is unlikely that this situation will change anytime soon. The AU's record of sending mixed signals to Somaliland is a refl ection of the lack of unity within the organisation on how best to proceed in dealing with Somalia, and is also indicative of a lack of idea on how to reconcile its policy of regional integration with the realities on the ground in Somalia which may not favour such discourses. In the end, it would appear that Somaliland's international recognition is not a pressing issue for anyone but Somaliland, and this may be the main reason why its international recognition is still lacking. Also, the fact that no African country seems to be ready to be the fi rst to recognize Somaliland (while many are happy to be the second) may yet prove the most considerable obstacle for Somaliland's recognition in the foreseeable future.
